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ABSTRACT 
 
Armed Non-State actors are groups involved in the use of force against states or within themselves under several 
guises including the right to self-determination. The activities of such groups have over the years led to the 
failure of several states across the globe, which on the other hand results in dire human and material 
consequences. As a result, the question has often been asked as to why such armed non-state actors thrive 
especially in the 21
st
 century, notwithstanding the prominence of international law. Is it that international law 
has failed in regulating such groups, or that the regulation has in it some inherent weaknesses which encourage 
their proliferation. This paper examines the role of non-state actors in state failure with reference to a few 
selected cases, to see how activities presented as emancipatory lead to human devastation. It also explores the 
international legal regime on non-state actors with a view to see if it encourages the emergence of violent 
groups in the form of national liberation movements. Using doctrinal methodology, the paper analyses both 
primary and secondary sources of data, relevant literature, and case law on the topic.  It finds that the 
proliferation of the activities of these groups who destroy the essence of statehood, may not be unconnected with 
the contemporary reality of the legal regime in international law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The true position of armed non-state actors 
within the international legal sphere in 
relation to the prohibition against the use 
of force is still one of the most highly 
debated topics in international law.
1
 To add 
to the quandary is the emergence of 
National Liberation Movements (NLMs) 
and the right to self-determination as one 
of the human rights recognised by the 
international community. The right to self-
determination is recognised as one of the 
fundamental principles upon which the UN 
system is built.
2
 Consequently, groups 
fighting for their right to self-determination 
popularly known as National Liberation 
Movements (NLMs) have traditionally 
been supported under the UN system. 
Hence, from 1945 when the UN Charter 
came into force, the number of armed non-
state actors fighting under the guise of 
NLMs has grown out of proportion. This is 
a sharp contrast to the prohibition against 
the use of force under the UN Charter.
3
 
This was made possible because despite 
their international legal position and the 
wide sympathy for NLMs, their exact 
meaning and practical definition is still at 
the best, hazy. The legal framework in 
international law is such that support to 
NLMs is legally justified; they are often 
given exalted position in international law 
and recognised by some states as the 
legitimate representatives of their people. 
This paper therefore, explores the 
relationship between the customary 
position in international law which 
supports the grant of recognition to 
belligerents and the support for NLMs 
from the UN, to see if the system has 
encouraged the use of force by these 
groups. It juxtaposes the practical 
happenings around the globe as is clearly 
demonstrated by a cursory look at the 
failure of many states leading to the 
outpouring of refugees globally, with the 
need for self-determination. The paper 
briefly surveys the unending crisis in 
Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria and, the Boko 
Haram violence in Nigeria, all of which 
have caused the displacement of millions. 
What they also have in common is the 
claim by several armed groups responsible 
for the crises that they are fighting to 
liberate their people. This being the case, 
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the paper poses the question if the 
international regulation of armed non-state 
actors is a true validation of the peoples’ 
right to self-determination. It tries to find if 
the blame is on the substance of the law or 
a failure to implement the law.  
 
NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
The term ‘non-state actors’ is used 
generally with reference to groups or 
organisations having international 
relevance and influence though they are 
not directly connected to sovereign states. 
The terminology is itself confusing if not 
contradictory as it is used to define or 
identify groups whose aims, and objectives 
are the extreme opposites. Hence, non-state 
actors may be used with reference to 
international civil society organisations or 
non-governmental organisations whose 
objectives are primarily civil and life-
saving or life-promoting. Used within this 
context, groups struggling to protect or 
promote human rights, freedom, education, 
health care, the environment and other 
noble causes fall within the broad 
definition of non-state actors.
4
  Likewise, 
the term denotes violent armed groups 
which have come to dominate the 
international scene using violence against 
states and other non-state entities to 
achieve their aims, most of which are 
political. This second classification is also 
referred to as armed non-state actors or 
organised armed groups;
5
 they constitute 
the focal point of this paper. Violent or 
organised armed groups are non-state 
actors that are involved in the use of force 
in diverse methods to pursue the 
achievement of their political or economic 
objectives. 
Though these groups may be as 
powerful as, or more powerful than some 
states, they are generally not recognised as 
subjects of international law in the strict 
legal sense.
6
 Non-state actors are 
designated as such because of the 
understanding that they bear no political, 
physical or fiscal allegiance to any 
particular state and are deficient of formal 
state structure.
7
 Indeed, they are 
autonomous from the governments of 
sovereign states notwithstanding any 
informal sympathy or support that may 
exist. Non-state actors, be they CSOs or 
organised armed groups, have emerged as 
powerful and relevant actors on the 
international scene. The impact of the 
activities of armed non-state actors has led 
to calls for their legal recognition as 
subjects of international law; at least to 
make them accountable for their actions.
8
  
 
FAILED STATE 
 
The concept of ‘failed state’ or ‘state 
failure’ though not new, is relatively 
obscure as it is cloaked in academic 
discourses that seem not to have converged 
on a common definition. For a start, while 
the term ‘failed state’ is popularly used 
across disciplines, other terms are also 
known to be used about relatively the same 
situation. For instance, terms such as 
‘fragile states’, ‘weak states’, and ‘failing 
states’,9 are also commonly used to 
describe such states which are otherwise 
recognized as having failed. But then, at 
what point a state is deemed to have failed 
is an issue not clearly determined in 
international law. It is true that 
international law recognizes certain basic 
features of statehood such as territory, 
government, population, and the capacity 
to enter relationship with other states.
10
 
Leaving the debates on the veracity of 
these attributes aside, one would find that 
neither writers nor states agree on what the 
exact connotations of either of these 
attributes are. Hence, how to define a state 
territory for instance is not a matter clearly 
settled in law; same goes for all the other 
elements. 
However, if these elements 
constitute the fundamental requirements 
for statehood in international law, does it 
follow thereby that deficiency or the 
absence of any of them automatically 
results in state failure? Obviously, 
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contemporary international law gives no 
credence to such a position. The provision 
of Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention 
though not universally accepted as the 
position of the law, has always been cited 
as the basis for academic discourses on 
statehood.
11
 Nevertheless, the requirements 
of the Convention were primarily stated as 
proposed standards for evaluating the 
formation of states; certainly, not as 
conditions for measuring the continuance 
of states. Be that as it may, it is highly 
complex to determine whether the 
formation of a new state is a matter of law 
or that of fact. This indeterminacy led to 
the principle of effectiveness as the most 
important element in determining 
statehood.
12
  
Consequently, most of the indexes 
of state failure available today are not so 
much concerned with the existence of any 
of the four elements mentioned above. In 
most cases, they tend to concentrate on 
what they consider the attributes of an 
effective state. It is therefore common to 
see references being made to deeply 
conflicted, dangerous, or tense states.
13
 In 
most cases, there is so much emphasis on 
the ability of the state or government to 
provide the necessities of life such as 
security, peace, and other civil needs.
14
 
Whether a state is considered as having 
failed or not will therefore, to a large 
extent depend on what criterion one uses to 
evaluate state failure.
15
 So much that 
different institutions or bodies may arrive 
at different positions in relation to whether 
a state has failed or not.
16
 The debates 
notwithstanding, one may arrive at certain 
basic elements or features intrinsic in all 
discussions of a failed state. Thus, it is 
common that state failure is characterised 
by some of these elements: absence or dire 
deficiency of social infrastructure such as 
health care, education, justice delivery, 
transportation, and a weak economy 
resulting into diminishing GDP per 
capita.
17
 It is also common to find that such 
a state is rife with crime and violence, be it 
ethnic, political, or religious, to make life 
difficult or unbearable.
18
 
The criteria for the determination of 
state failure are not sacrosanct, nor are they 
fixed by the people living in such states; 
consequently, it is difficult to decide 
whether a state has failed by mere 
theoretical analysis. This is more the case 
when such analysis is being made from 
without such states deprived of input from 
the people living therein. Notwithstanding, 
it may be concluded that where such 
people living in that territory begin to flee 
the comfort of their homes and their 
comfort zones, then the institution of 
statehood has failed. People do not find it 
easy to abandon their homes and the means 
of livelihood they are used to; when they 
do that, then something is fundamentally 
wrong. One can assume that the essence of 
that place being called home has been 
taken away. Within the context of this 
paper therefore, a state is considered as 
having failed if it is unable to meet the 
basic social requirements expected of it by 
its citizens. These may include, though is 
not limited to peace, security and social 
infrastructure. State failure in this context 
is therefore seen more as a process 
culminating in deterioration of the state’s 
capability to meet up to its responsibilities 
to its citizens and its  inability to protect its 
citizens from genocide, crime against 
humanity, war crime and ethnic cleansing.. 
And within this context, such a failure is 
because of the violent activities of non-
state actors either against one another or 
against the state as an institution. 
 
THE ACTIVITIES OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS AND STATE FAILURE 
 
Armed non-state actors in the form of 
national liberation movements, rebels or 
insurgents, and terrorist organisations have 
been responsible for the failure of many 
states especially in the developing world. 
This trend has become more pronounced 
and pressing in African and middle-eastern 
states over the past three decades. In some 
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of these countries, governance and the 
essence of statehood has been brought to a 
standstill or to the barest minimum. As 
may be seen with respect to the selected 
states below, the activities of armed non-
state actors have brought these states to 
their knees, practically drawing them into 
the fold of failed states. Essentially, 
because of the violence perpetrated by 
these groups, the institution of governance 
in these states has been brought to a halt. 
Consequently, since the essence of 
government is to provide security for the 
population, where such cannot be 
guaranteed, in addition to diminished or 
outright absence of infrastructure, the state 
might well be deemed to have failed. 
 
SOMALIA 
 
Somalia is one of the countries with many 
of its citizens displaced as refugees in 
several states across the globe.
19
 The 
political crisis in Somalia might have had 
its roots in the 1977 regime change that 
altered the political structure of the 
country. Although it had witnessed three 
major armed conflicts between 1977 and 
1991,
20
 the level of devastation got worse 
in the years that ensued thereafter. There 
are several factors responsible for the 
destruction and insecurity in Somalia, chief 
among them is the involvement of non-
state actors in the form of NLMs using 
force. From the formation of the Somali 
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 
1978, the Somali National Movement 
(SNM) in 1981, the United Somali 
Congress, USC, the Somali Patriotic 
Movement, and the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Movement in the early 
1990s,
21
 the security situation has only 
deteriorated. Others include the Al-Itihaad 
al-Islamiya (AIAI) 1983, the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU), and Al Shabaab in 
2005.
22
 With more violent non-state actors 
emerging in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
situation intensified with the violence that 
followed leading to famine, death, and 
devastation. Hence, the emergence of these 
armed groups and their involvement in the 
use of force cannot be divorced from the 
devastation in Somalia. This has led to 
destruction of lives, property, and public 
infrastructure; insecurity and near state of 
anarchy. This situation is responsible for 
the emergence of Somalia as one of the 
most classic examples of a failed state in 
contemporary discourse.
23
 
 
THE BOKO HARAM VIOLENCE IN 
NIGERIA 
 
The emergence of the Boko Haram sect 
and the ensuing conflict between the sect 
and government forces has had devastating 
impact on some parts of the country and its 
population. Most of the destructions and 
devastations faced were caused by the 
Boko Haram fighters and in some 
instances government troops in response to 
attacks by the group.
24
 The Boko Haram 
group also emerged initially as freedom 
fighters brandishing ideals meant to 
emancipate the people from injustice and 
oppression. The war progressively trickled 
into nearby nations, with amplified 
permeation, attacks, recruitment, and 
suicide-bombings by the armed group, 
provoking the movements of people from 
the conflict zone in Nigeria across borders 
to Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.
25
 The 
activities of the Boko Haram armed group 
has led to the destruction of private 
property and public infrastructure in the 
North-eastern part of Nigeria on a scale 
never witnessed before.
26
 In some cases, 
entire townships have been annihilated 
while putting pressure on limited 
infrastructure in others as a result of the 
influx of displaced persons.
27
 The result is 
a near failure of the institution of statehood 
especially between the years 2011-2016. 
The eruption of the Boko Haram rebellion 
has increasingly turned into the sole reason 
for displacement in the area. It has resulted 
in the displacement of no less than 2.3 
million persons either as refugees, or 
internally displaced people (IDPs).
28
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AFGHANISTAN 
 
The crisis in Afghanistan which has also 
led to mayhem and the destruction of lives, 
property and public infrastructure has a 
long and complex history.
29
 It is true that 
such factors as colonial British influence, 
deepening ethnic, religious, and sectarian 
differences had their impact on the 
system.
30
 However, the destruction that led 
to consistent insecurity and diminished 
social infrastructure has its immediate 
roots in the activities of armed non-state 
actors in the state. This can be traced back 
to the 1920’s with the early emergence of 
such ethnic and religious groups opposing 
the attempts at westernization.
31
  
The Russian invasion in the 1980s 
and the American support to several armed 
groups encouraged the militarisation of 
rural Afghanistan escalating the 
burgeoning violence.
32
 One can see a 
pattern like other states where these groups 
first rise as NLMs. The eventual 
emergence of the Taliban after the 
withdrawal of the US from the country and 
the events that led to the 9/11 attacks and 
subsequent US invasion are all relatable to 
the activities of these armed non-state 
actors. Interestingly, they all emerged 
under the guise of NLMs or something in 
that nature. Hence, the gradual dwindling 
of infrastructure and governance in 
Afghanistan has a direct correlation to the 
activities of these armed non-state actors.
33
 
Consequently, as the violence escalated 
and reached its peak with the US invasion, 
coupled with a near absence of the 
structure of governance, the state cascaded 
to a failed status.
34
 More than any of the 
states considered, the case of Afghanistan 
is more clearly related to the activities of 
non-state actors leading to its failure. 
 
SYRIA 
 
Syria has been on the international radar in 
terms of violence and humanitarian crisis 
for seven years now. Though the Syrian 
conflict started as a civil resistance to 
human rights abuses and highhandedness 
by government, it quickly escalated into a 
fully blown civil war. This conflict has so 
far caused the loss of more than half a 
million lives and destruction to both 
private and public property.
35
 The brutal 
response by the Syrian government was 
responsible for the escalation of the crisis 
in Syria; as the government was accused of 
arresting and killing of innocent citizens 
including children.
36
 
However, the escalation of the 
Syrian conflict into a complete war has its 
immediate roots in the creation and 
organisation of the so-called opposition 
together with the foreign support they 
received.
37
 The Syrian opposition 
comprising of several armed non-state 
actors strengthened by financial support 
and weapons from foreign countries took 
on the Syrian government in open violent 
confrontation.
38
 To make matters worse, 
countries like Iran and Russia got directly 
involved in support of the Syrian 
government while the US and other 
western states supported the rebels. This 
situation gave birth to the emergence of 
other armed groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS 
who later got involved in the devastation of 
the Syrian people.
39
 The result of this is 
one of the most devastating humanitarian 
crises witnessed since the end of World 
War II. So far, law and order has evaded 
the Syrian people; public infrastructure and 
private property has been destroyed to the 
extent that one wonders what is left of the 
Syrian state.  
In all the states discussed above, 
not ignoring similar cases like Libya, 
South Sudan, Burundi and DRC to mention 
but a few, there is a clearly comparable 
pattern evolving across the globe. All the 
conflict situations are either primarily 
caused by armed non-state actors, or where 
they were not the main cause, their 
involvement escalates it. Almost always, 
these armed non-state actors take up arms 
in the name of protecting their states or 
people. Similarly, these activities certainly 
lead to the failure or near failure of that 
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state. The question that begs for an answer 
is whether the international legal regime 
has failed to regulate the activities of 
armed non-state actors by whatsoever 
named called, or that the law as it is helps 
in breeding them. 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
REGIME ON NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
Some of these non-state actors have been 
recognised players in international law for 
as long as the system existed; yet the legal 
regulation of non-state actors is still 
fuzzy.
40
 For instance, rebels and 
insurgents, graduating to become 
belligerents have been part of the 
international system as it developed 
throughout the ages.
41
 Though the 
classification of terrorists as non-state 
actors might not have a long history in 
international law as rebels for instance, 
terrorism also has a long history on the 
international sphere.
42
 As for NLMs, they 
might initially have been subsumed under 
rebellion or insurgency before their days of 
glory starting after World War II. 
Contemporary reality however, shows that 
armed non-state actors have emerged as 
influential actors in international law 
notwithstanding their blurry legal position. 
This has led to calls for the recognition of 
their legal status as subjects of 
contemporary international law; that will at 
least bring them within the purview of the 
law.
43
 But then, the nature of international 
law is such that it remains state-centred in 
its structure and law-making process. 
States on the other hand are not willing to 
accept non-state actors as subjects of 
international law as that will have dicey 
consequences especially bearing in mind 
the violent and illegal activities of most of 
these groups.
44
 
For rebels and insurgents, the legal 
position is more of a gradual movement 
from pure illegal activities to be dealt with 
under domestic law enforcement to pseudo 
recognition in international. All subjects 
taking up arms against their state were 
considered as rebels who may gain legal 
recognition once in control of territory and 
population, leading to recognition of 
belligerency.
45
 Thus, control over territory 
in addition to having a just cause 
transmutes a movement hitherto seen as 
seditious or rebellious into civil war where 
the law of war applies.
46
 At this point, the 
belligerents have attained a subject-like 
status in international law, and may be 
recognised by other states willing to enter 
legal relationship with them. The position 
is such that simple criminal activities may 
blossom into strong opposition having 
control over territory and capable of 
resisting the state structure. Once this 
happens, recognition of belligerency 
imbues them with a quasi-state status in a 
civil war situation.
47
 At this point, it is no 
longer an issue of domestic law 
enforcement against criminal elements or 
scuffles. Belligerents are recognised as 
subjects with rights to conclude treaties in 
customary international law;
48
 this 
favourable position of the law towards 
insurgency paved the way for the rise of 
NLMs especially after World War II.
49
 
As for National Liberation 
Movements, (NLMs) the desire to gain 
independence by nations under colonial 
rule and the attempt at moral redemption 
by western colonialists paved the way for 
their favourable treatment in international 
law. The recognition of the rights of all 
peoples to self-determination under the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights further reinforced the 
position of NLMs.
50
 NLMs typically were 
identified with the fight against colonial 
rule though that is clearly not the only 
meaning given to NLMs as it is capable of 
fitting into any struggle for self-
determination.
51
 As opposed to rebels or 
insurgents, though they often occupy a part 
of the territory they are fighting to liberate, 
that is not a necessary qualification as they 
can even be based out of the country.
52
 The 
support received by NLMs stems from the 
sympathy they enjoyed from former 
colonies and developing nations. This led 
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to the exalted status they received under 
the UN and its agencies. Thus, the practice 
of the UN and its organs including the 
Security Council (UNSC) over the years 
has deemingly developed into extensive 
customary international law. The UNSC 
has granted observer status to the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO);
53
 just as several NLMs could take 
part in sessions of the UNGA and other 
UN specialised bodies though without 
voting rights.
54
 In certain instances such as 
that of the South-West Africa People’s 
Organisation (SWAPO), NLMs were 
recognised by the UNGA as the authentic 
representative of their people.
55
 
NLMs are accorded an edge over 
insurgents and rebels in international law 
as they are not required to have control 
over land as a precondition for their 
recognition.
56
 In addition, states are not 
precluded by law from advancing 
financial, military, or political support to 
NLMs as opposed to what obtains with 
respect to rebels and insurgents. In fact, 
support to regimes suppressive of NLMs is 
what the law proscribes.
57
 The position of 
NLMs is therefore, that of subjects of 
international law as they can maintain 
offices in other countries, conclude treaties 
with other states, and are bound by norms 
of international law on the conduct of 
warfare and treaties.
58
  
With respect to terrorist 
organisations, the difficulty in agreeing to 
a common definition of the term “terrorist” 
or “terrorism” complicates the search for a 
universal legal framework on terrorists. 
Interestingly, the struggle for self-
determination is always one of the 
contentious hurdles to agreement on a 
common definition of terrorism; though 
other issues such as interests of states are 
also factors. So that in defining terrorism, 
violence by NLMs has always been a point 
of contention as some states will insist on 
excluding same from any definition of 
terrorism.
59
 As states have historically 
engaged in violence as they still are, the 
problem seems to be that of determining 
whose violence suits categorisation as 
terrorism.
60
 Consequently, we see some 
states attempting to maintain their hold on 
use of violence especially against 
vulnerable and minority groups; on the 
other hand, sympathetic states are also bent 
on allowing such groups the possibility of 
retaliating with similar violence. These 
groups normally come in the form of 
NLMs fighting for self-determination of 
their people.  
Notwithstanding the difficulty in 
agreeing on a common definition of 
terrorism, there is consensus in 
condemning acts of terrorism globally. The 
illegality of terrorism is therefore not in 
doubt as such activities constitute crimes in 
international criminal law such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. Terrorist activities are also 
proscribed under international 
humanitarian law, human rights law, and 
customary international law. In addition, 
most terrorist activities are clearly 
violations of norms of jus cogens.
61
 This is 
in addition to the array of international 
legal instruments on terrorism and UNGA 
and UNSC resolutions on terrorism all of 
which help in providing direction on the 
legal framework. Accordingly, though a 
common definition may be desirable and 
has not been forthcoming, there is already 
an international consensus on the illegality 
of terrorist offences. The problem with the 
lack of a universally accepted definition 
however, is that several acts of violence 
which would otherwise have qualified as 
terrorism fall in the grey area. This exactly 
is where violent activities by self-styled 
NLMs by what so ever name called always 
find support. This is one of the 
shortcomings of the legal regime that has 
in no small measure contributed to the 
failure of states. 
The Effect of the Legal Regime on Non-
State Actors on State Failure 
The international legal regime on armed 
non-state actors seem quite favourable to 
the activities of armed groups. Violent 
groups which have been responsible for 
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destruction of lives and property can 
transmute into an enviable position in 
international law simply by establishing 
themselves as formidable forces against a 
state structure. Thus this position means 
that they can become vital players in 
international law depending on how 
forceful and violent they can be. Therefore, 
all they need to do is to ensure access to as 
much destructive arsenals as possible and 
to unleash as much violence and 
destruction as can grant them control over 
territory.  
The confusion in international law 
over who really is a terrorist has also 
helped in providing safe-heavens for 
violent groups engaged in the destruction 
of lives and property. This is reflected in 
the way groups which are essentially prone 
to violence and destruction end up 
claiming to be freedom fighters and 
liberation movements for the same people 
whose lives and livelihoods they have 
destroyed. A classic example is the 
narrative on how the US established the 
Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan as freedom fighters supplying 
them with arms and finances.
62
 These same 
groups were later categorised as terrorist 
by the US and used as the basis for the 
invasion of Afghanistan. More recently, 
though the so called Syrian opposition was 
responsible for gross violation of human 
rights and humanitarian laws, several 
western countries recognised and 
supported it against the legitimate 
government in that country.
63
 The result 
was devastation and the near failure of the 
Syrian state.  
The neutrality of the legal regime 
on the advent of rebellious groups for 
instance, enables the proliferation of armed 
non-state actors under the guise of NLMs 
across third world countries which have 
limited resources to tackle such challenges. 
And because the law allows it, other states 
support these groups both openly and 
covertly either as NLMs or belligerents. As 
a result, these groups continue to unleash 
perdition in these territories making peace 
and security impossible to achieve. Peace 
and security on the other hand are core 
requirements in every society howsoever 
developed or primeval; just as violence 
negates these concepts.  Because peace and 
security are needed for the most basic 
development or even human existence to 
thrive, it is not surprising that wheresoever 
violence becomes the norm, peace and 
security are thereby diminished if not 
prevaricated. On the other hand, armed 
non-state end up destroying the very 
essence of the societies they initially set 
out to protect. This is typically identifiable 
in almost all cases involving armed groups. 
The relationship is also the other way 
around; where states fail, it serves as a 
breeding ground for armed non-state actors 
to thrive.
64
 This is so because it ostensibly 
becomes ungoverned territory where 
anything goes due to the absence of, or 
deficient law enforcement. 
Because the uses of force by armed 
non-state actors seriously threaten the state 
monopoly of force, it tends to affect the 
political order and every other aspect of 
life in such communities. Hence, use of 
force by non-state actors undermine 
security in states and of states as it often 
serves as the foundation for illicit trade in 
drugs and weapons, illegal trades, and 
money laundering.
65
 Because the 
domination of the use of force by a state is 
an integral part of contemporary statehood, 
relating the political order of a state and 
the use of force by non-state actors is 
essential. Once these non-state actors veer 
into the state’s monopoly on the use of 
force, it automatically creates a problem 
for the relevant state and its population 
both domestically and internationally. For 
the most part therefore, violent armed 
groups are a cause of complications for the 
communities they operate in. This is 
because the violence brought about by 
armed non-state actors destroy peace, 
security, and development; hence, where 
these things are found to be lacking or 
crucially deficient, the state would have 
failed. Where the state fails, it means it can 
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no longer cater for the needs of people 
living therein. Typically, states where non-
state actors flourish end up as failed states 
because of the ensuing violence which 
leads to anarchy. It is therefore not 
surprising that states like Somali, 
Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan, and 
Nigeria are constantly present within the 
failed state indexes developed by several 
organisations.
66
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The violence perpetrated by armed non-
state actors has caused displacement of 
millions of people globally despite the 
prohibition on the use of force in 
international law. These groups have 
somehow been able to continue to 
destabilize many states and populations 
because of their resort to violence. The 
failure of international law to curb the 
activities of armed non-state actors may be 
seen both from the inadequacy of the law 
and failure or refusal to apply the law, 
resulting in the favourable treatment 
accorded these groups. International law 
has over the years favoured the emergence 
of belligerents by according them subject-
like positions and rights once they are in 
control of territories and indicate a just 
cause. This has made it easier for all 
violent groups to strive by whatsoever 
means to acquire control over territory 
thereby making it possible for states to 
accord them recognition.  
Moreover, there has also been 
deliberate misapplication of the law by 
states bent on supporting armed struggles 
and civil strife. This comes in the form of 
supporting groups involved in violent 
activities that have led to death and 
displacement of the population. The failure 
to agree on a universally acceptable 
definition of terrorism coupled with the 
favourable and often exalted position given 
to NLMs made it possible for groups to 
easily metamorphose into freedom fighters.  
It is therefore necessary that the 
blank cheque support given to NLMs be 
curtailed by placing certain criterion on 
recognition of such groups and provision 
of support to them. The international 
community must develop a process 
whereby genuine NLMs should first be 
identified by a special committee of the 
UNSC before states can deal with them or 
provide them support. It is true that 
peoples’ right to self-determination should 
be protected and jealously guarded; 
however, the essence of such a right should 
not be lost in the process. Otherwise, what 
is the essence of self-determination when 
most of the population have either been 
killed or displaced? It is also necessary that 
a common and universally accepted 
definition of terrorism be arrived at in 
international law. This will help in filtering 
genuine NLMs as opposed to groups 
engaged in terrorism which end up 
destroying and displacing the population. 
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